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A Future Without the Administrative State? 
 
 
Exploring the Administrative State 
 
Erin Morrow Hawley* 
 
The administrative state today “wields vast power and touches almost 
every aspect of daily life.”1  There’s no question that the Founders would 
have been surprised by the current administrative state.2  By and large, how-
ever, both the academy and Article III judges are either reluctant or enthusias-
tic devotees of the administrative state.  A variety of arguments have been put 
forward to situate the Fourth Branch within the constitutional fabric, from 
constitutional moments,3 to the Supreme Court’s pragmatic recognition that, 
given government as we know it, “Congress simply cannot do its job absent 
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”4  As Jeff Pojan-
owski puts it in this Symposium, “Th[e] administrative state is here, and, 
absent radical and unlikely changes in the scope of federal power, it is not 
going away.”5 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. 
 1. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 
(2010). 
 2. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (as one 
Supreme Court Justice put it, the administrative state, “with its reams of regulations[,] 
would leave [the Framers] rubbing their eyes”). 
 3. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 
99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the 
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).  But see PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative Estate, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
 4. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 5. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1075 
(2016). 
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Yet a number of Supreme Court Justices have expressed concerns about 
the “danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.”6  As a 
result, the Court has been increasingly open to structural challenges to the 
administrative state in the last few terms.7  In particular, the Court has fo-
cused on the level of deference due administrative regulations.8  It has resur-
rected the major questions doctrine,9 recommended overturning the Auer 
doctrine,10 and individual Justices have even questioned the constitutionality 
of Chevron deference.11 
It is time to consider the administrative state afresh given the Supreme 
Court’s renewed interest in challenges to the status quo.  In this vein, the Mis-
souri Law Review Symposium seeks to advance the academic discussion by 
looking closely at questions regarding the contours of the administrative state 
and, in particular, examining reasonable alternatives to Chevron deference. 
Professor Hamburger begins by further developing his claim that mod-
ern administrative law is unconstitutional and addresses concerns raised by 
scholars in response to his book Is Administrative Law Unlawful?12  Professor 
Hamburger first counters arguments that the royal prerogative power was 
unlimited.13  He argues instead that such power was at times bound by statute, 
and that in all events, the extralegal (meaning power exercised by administra-
tors outside of the law) nature of the prerogative power remained problematic 
and was addressed by English constitutional ideals, providing a basis for 
 
 6. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting). 
 7. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015); 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013); Stern v. Mar-
shall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).  See also Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Adminis-
trative Adjudication Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1023–24 (2016) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court of the United States and individual Justices have welcomed structural 
challenges to the administrative state and Article I courts.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338; Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 9. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (determining “whether [tax 
credits] are available on Federal Exchanges is a question of deep ‘economic and polit-
ical significance’ . . . [and] had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, 
it surely would have done so expressly”); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 
2444 (“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency deci-
sions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”). 
 10. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339–
40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 11. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 12. Philip Hamburger, Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response 
to Paul Craig, 81 MO. L. REV. 939, 939 (2016). 
 13. Id. at 942. 
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American constitutional concerns over extralegal power.14  Professor Ham-
burger also responds to the claim that the existence of local and non-royal 
extralegal “administrative” power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
England establishes that the English constitution did not in fact develop to 
limit extralegal administrative power.15  Professor Paul Craig, for example, 
argues that such power was approved of by Parliament and by English courts 
and that this legitimate power, and not the prerogative power, was the ante-
cedent of contemporary American administrative law.16  Professor Hamburg-
er responds that English constitutional ideals condemned the prerogative 
power and were deployed mostly against centralized prerogative power.17  In 
the U.S. Constitution, however, the Founders barred almost all extralegal 
power.18  In sum, Professor Hamburger argues that early Americans drafted 
their own constitutions, and, in particular, the U.S. Constitution, which con-
demn the use of extralegal administrative authority by looking to the English 
constitutional response to extralegal edicts.19 
Professor Jonathan Adler argues that, while Chevron deference may be 
here to stay, it should be “confined to its proper domain.”20  The underlying 
rationale for deference, he argues, should determine Chevron’s “scope and 
application.”21  Thus, since Chevron is “predicated on a theory of delega-
tion,” Chevron deference should only be available when Congress has in fact 
delegated interpretive authority.22 
Professor Joseph Postell sees the growing administrative state as a threat 
to republican government.  He claims that the nondelegation theory has been 
unpersuasive because that theory is based upon wrong constitutional assump-
tions.23  He argues that, while the doctrine “is typically linked to the theory of 
the separation of powers, the true foundation . . . is the idea of the social 
compact and the related theory of republican government.”24  According to 
Postell, the transfer of legislative power to administrative agencies is prob-
lematic because it is outside the chain of accountability – the people do not 
elect agency officials either directly or indirectly.25 
 
 14. Id. at 942–51. 
 15. Id. at 951–69. 
 16. Id. at 951. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 956–58. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 985 
(2016). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Joseph Postell, “The People Surrender Nothing”: Social Compact Theory, 
Republicanism, and the Modern Administrative State, 81 MO. L. REV. 1003, 1003, 
1008 (2016). 
 24. Id. at 1003. 
 25. Id. 
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Professor Kent Barnett contends that challenges to administrative judges 
and their appearance of partiality “are well positioned to be part of the new 
wave of structural challenges to the administrative state.”26  He believes that 
challenges to administrative judging may fare well for several reasons.  First, 
to require nonpartiality from administrative law judges would not require the 
Court to overrule any of its decisions, and indeed, such a requirement is con-
sistent with recent case law.27  Second, a challenge to the partiality of admin-
istrative judging fits within the Court’s recent affinity for formalist results.28  
Finally, as a practical matter, there may be enough votes on the Supreme 
Court for partiality challenges to succeed.29  Professor Barnett concludes by 
arguing that, since “finding partiality within the administrative state would 
likely have significant, widespread disruptive effects, the President, agencies, 
and Congress should rethink administrative adjudication before courts make 
them do so.”30 
Professor Andy Grewal argues that the Supreme Court’s shifting attitude 
towards administrative deference should not affect its deference to the IRS’s 
interpretation of the income tax code.31  Professor Grewal posits that courts 
should defer to the IRS, rather than apply the rule of lenity, in dual applica-
tion (civil and criminal) statutes, “because the rule of lenity has no place in 
the construction of the income tax provisions.”32  This is because such stat-
utes do not compel or prohibit behavior; they “simply describe consequences 
associated with particular transactions.”33 
Professor Aditya Bamzai takes us on a historical journey to recover the 
true meaning of Marbury v. Madison’s famous statement that “it is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the [judiciary] to say what the law is.”34  He 
argues that recent decisions limiting deference to agencies based on Marbury 
have ignored the statutory analysis in that case.35  On a closer read, the Mar-
bury Court considered three types of “deference,” “through its (1) treatment 
of executive custom in statutory interpretation, (2) discussion of the ‘political 
question’ doctrine, and (3) use of the ministerial/executive distinction under 
the writ of mandamus.”36  Professor Bamzai argues that since these doctrines 
together gave rise to modern deference to executive interpretation, under-
 
 26. Barnett, supra note 7, at 1025. 
 27. Id. at 1026. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Andy S. Grewal, Why Lenity Has No Place in the Income Tax Laws, 81 MO. 
L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2016). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v. Madison and the Concept of Judicial Deference, 
81 MO. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2016) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803)). 
 35. Id. at 1062. 
 36. Id. 
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standing their application in Marbury gives us a better understanding of the 
rise of judicial deference.37  It also provides a mode of critique.38 
Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski imagines a world without Chevron where 
courts review agency conclusions on questions of law de novo.39  He argues 
that, while this alternative has some appeal, it is unlikely to bring as much 
change as the Chevron critics believe.40  Indeed, the largest “change would 
come from how we think about law and policy in the administrative state.”41  
Instead of the moderate legal realism underlying Chevron, non-deferential 
review rests on a far more classical understanding.42  Professor Pojanowski 
argues that this classical understanding sheds light “on the rise and (partial) 
fall of Chevron in administrative legal thought.”43 
Professor Christopher Walker maintains that, with the passing of Justice 
Scalia, the Supreme Court is unlikely to toss Chevron (or even Auer) defer-
ence to the curb, but it might well embrace a different narrowing mechanism: 
a context-specific Chevron doctrine.44  Professor Walker explains that the 
Chief Justice’s invocation of the major questions doctrine in King v. Burwell 
at the Step Zero stage is a novel use of that doctrine.45  In particular, he ar-
gues that the Chief Justice’s decision to avoid entirely the Chevron frame-
work is an outworking of his earlier dissent in City of Arlington.46  In that 
case, the Chief Justice argued that Congress must have delegated to an agen-
cy on a specific issue in order for the Court to assume that Congress intended 
the courts to defer to agency interpretations.47  Counting votes, Professor 
Walker argues that the academy should pay attention to the Chief Justice’s 
Chevron-limiting approach, as it may well become the law of the land.48  
Further, Professor Walker explains how recent empirical studies of congres-
sional drafters and agency rule drafters provide support for a context-specific 
Chevron doctrine.49 
Professor Emily Bremer considers a novel alternative to a reduced or 
even eliminated administrative state: private governance.50  Her article chal-
lenges the assumption that there are only two options: “governmental regula-
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Pojanowski, supra note 5. 
 40. Id. at 1078. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 
MO. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2016). 
 45. See id. at 1103, 1107. 
 46. Id. at 1105–06. 
 47. Id. at 1105. 
 48. Id. at 1099, 1106. 
 49. Id. at 1107. 
 50. Emily S. Bremer, Private Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. 
REV. 1115, 1115 (2016). 
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tion or no regulation at all.”51  She argues that private governance – meaning 
nongovernmental action in the pursuit of traditional government goals – may 
complement and in some instances replace the administrative state.52  She 
offers a number of current examples and suggests that comparative institu-
tional analysis can help identify situations where private governance “may be 
an effective and attractive alternative to governmental regulation.”53 
 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1119–20. 
 53. Id. at 1120. 
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